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CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW.
1891.
I .
The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 amonu, other things provides:
"That on and after July first,1891,ana until July first 1905,
there shall be paidfrom any moneys in the Treasury not other-
Lwise appropriated under the provisions of section 3689 of th/
Revised Statutesto the producers of sugar testing not less
than ninety degrees by the polariscope,from beets,sorghum or
sugar cane grown within the United States,or from maple sap
produced within the United Statesa bounty of two cents per
pound;and upon such sugar testil less than ninety degrees by
the polariscope,and not less than eighty degrees,a Lounty of
one and three fourth cents per pound under such rules and rog-
ulations as the Commissioner of Internal Revenuewith the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Treasury,shall prescribe.
And for the payment of these bounties the Secretary of
the Treasury is authorized to draw warrants on the Treasurpr
of the Unitdd States for such sums as shall be necessary,which
sums shall be certified to him by the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenueby whom the bounties shall be disbursed,and no
bounty shall be allowed or paid to any person licensed asfore-
said in any one year upon any quanity of sugar less than five
hundred pounds. "
The subject of this paper will be: First the authority
under which Congress acted in granting bounties to sugar pro-
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ducers: Second,the extent to which the courts may go behind
the legislature in declaring an act unconstitutional.
Other questions might very appropriately be dealt with
in this connection if time would allow. What constitutes a pub-
lic as distinguished from a private purpose;and whether lend-
ing government aid for the purpose of developiing the United
States into a sugar producing country is a public purpose or
not,are questionsthat should receive more attention than will
be possible to give them here. However,they are largely ques-
tion of policy or expediency;they must be passed upon by the
legislature rather than the judiciary. Questions of this na-
ture have given rise to much animated controversey in the past.
the
In the discussion of them ablest and purest minds in our his-
tory have disagreed; They have been and are prominent in the
strue s of political pLarties;defeat on either side does not
seem to silence opposition or to give security to victory.The
'contest is often renewed;and the attack and defence maintain-
ed with equal ardor.
In considering the first point,it must be remembered
that the Federal government is one of enumerated poersits
jurisdiction being limited to subjects named in the Constitu-
tion. Herein lies the chief difference between the Federal
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Constitution and the State Constitutions. In the latter the
powers are limited by the subjects enumerated; and in this the
one is no more a limited government than the other. The gener-
al government finds its jurisdiction in the subjects enumera-
ted;the state governments find theirs in the subjects not en-
umerated. It should ever kept in mind,however,that this dif-
ference extends only to subjects of jurisdiction and not au-
thority and modes of administration.
The powers delegated to the general government are found
in Article I section 8 of the Federal Constitution.These
powers are classified uncder eighteen subdivisions. The power
to give encouragement to sugar growing must be gathered from
them or the act is unconstitutional;as Congress has power only'
to legislate upon subjects within the scope of the enumerated
powers.
It requires but litle study of this section to convince
one that this powerif it exists at all,is found in subdivis-
ion one. It would be impossible to justify the act under any
of the subsequently enumerated powers. They specil/f.cally
name the subjects over which Congress shall have authority.
The power to lend government aid to any great interest in which
the people of the United States are engaged,may be said to ex-
ist in two instances only: First is that of subdivision
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three,which is as follows: "Congress shall have power to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations,and among the several states
and with the Indian Tribes." And the second that of subdivis-
ion eight reading as folbows: "Congress shall have power to
promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts,by pro-
curing for limited times,to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
It could not be seriously contended that the granting of
bounties to sugar producers had to do either with the regu-
lation of commerce or the promotion of science or the useful
art s.
The constitutionality of the sugar bounty clause of this
act then,depends primaril'y upon the powers given to Congress
by subdivision one of section eight which is as follows:
"Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxesdutiesim-
posts,and excises to pay the debts and provide for the connon
defence and general welfare of the United States;but all du-
tiesimposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States. "
The extent of the power given to congress by the clause
last quoted has been in the pastis at presentand probably
will continue to be,a source of much discussion. The power
granted by the phrase , "to provide for the general welfare".
has been the chief bone of contention. iany of our ablest
statesmen have differed as to the proper construction to beA'
upon this clause. Some contend that the words "to lay and col-
lect taxesduties,imposts and excises," constitute a substan-
tive grant of power in themselves and are not limited by that
part of the clause which follows. Others argue that the clause
"to pa- the debts and provide for the common defence and gen-
eral welfare" qualifies what goes beforeand that taxesim-
posts etc.,could only be levied for the purpose of paying the
debts and providing for the common defence and general welX-
fare of the nation. The latter construction is the generally
accepted one; it is accordance with the pr-ctice of the nation-
al governent,and sanctioned by eminent constitutional writ-
ers.
I If the former be the proper interpretation the govern-
ment of the United States it is saidis in reality,one of un-
limited powers notwithstanding the subsequent emumeration of
specific powers."It not only renders wholly unimportant and
unnecessary the subsequent enumeration,but plainly extends far
beyond them,and creates a general authority in Congress to
pass all laws which they may deem for the common defence and
general we].fare." (Story on Const.§ 909. )
But as to whether there are two distinct grants of power
included in subdivision one,or the clause "to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and the general welfare",
is made to qualify what goes before,can make but litle dif-
ference for all practical purposes. The power of the govern-
ment or the security of the people has litle to gain or lose
by the adoption of one or the other of these constructions.
Either one attains the same end. If the power of taxation con-
tained in the grant is unlimitedit means simply the power of
the people to tax themselves; for it must not be forgotten
that our government is adninistered by the people coming from
each state and the districts in the state. When they lay and
collect money for any purpose,they alone must bear the burden;
and there can be but litle to fear in the power of a govern-
ment which is ever to be administered by the people. It is
safe to say that the people will not long oppress themselves
beyond their own endurance. "The fears and jealousies express-
ed of the aggressiveness of governments upon the people pre-
supposes the separation of the government from the peopleor
its independence of the people." (Tiffany on Const.§ 338).
On the other hand if we limit the powers of the govern-
ment"to lay and collect taxesdutiesinposts and excises" only
for the purposes of "paying the debts and providing for the
common defence and general welfare" of the nation; recognizzing
7.
as we do alsothat the administrators of the government are
the people themselves,who must necessarily be the exclusive
judges of what purposes are fvr the common defence and gener-
al welfare;the limitation is a check of but litle value.There
will never arise an occasion to raise a revenue for any other
purpose than those specified in the limitation. When the wide
range of subjects which may engage the attention of govern-
ments having to do with the common defence and general we] -
fare of the nation are taken into consideration it will be
found that everything pertaining to the duty of the govern-
ment is necessarily included. It is the duty of every civil
government to provide for the security and for the general
welfare of the people. The government founded by our ances-
tors was intended to be entrusted with the authority of pro-
moting the general welfare of the people and was clothed with
every power essential to that end. It is not to be presumed
that they had any misgivings as to this power. They were then,
as the people ever after would be,the best judges of what
means were necessary for such purposes. Judge Story says at p,
638: "If the power to provide for the common defence and gen-
eral welfare is an independent porer,then it is said the gov-
ernment is unlimited and the subsequent enumeration of powei-s
i
is unnecessary and useless. If it is a mere appendage or quali-
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fication of the power to lay taxesstill it involves.of gener-
al appropriations of the money so raised,which indirectly pro-
duces the same result. "
Another interpretation contended for is that the clause
"to provide for the common defence and promote the general
welfare" of the nation has no significance per se;but is
merely a prelude to what follows;that it simply contains gen-
eral terms, explained and limited, by the subjoined specifica--
tions,and therefore could never be taken into consideration
in justifying the legislative act. But the great objection to
this construction is that it robs the clause of all meaning.
No one has a right to assume that any part of the constitu-
tion is useless or without a meaning; and especially is the
true,when the attempt is to rob it of what is a natural and
appropriate meaning. Such an interpretation of the constitu-
tion would not be construing it; it would be reading that in-
strument to suit ourselves; in shortit would be doing the
very thing so much complained of,to make a constitution,and
not to administer or construe that hich our forefathers
gave us. Connenting on this unatural construction Judge Stor-y
says at § 913: "it is not said to 'provide for the common de-
fence and promote the general welfare in the followling man-
ner,viz.,' which would be the natural expression to indicate
such an intention. But it stands entirely disconnected from
every subsequent clause,both in sense and runcuation; and is no
more a part of them than they are of the power to lay taxes'
The same great author says:at p,642: "One of the best
rules of interpretation,one which common sense and reason fo.'-
bid us to overlook,is,that when the object of a power is clear-
ly defined by its terms or avvowed in the context,it ought to
be construed so as to obtain the object,and not to defeat it.
The circumstance that so construedthe power may be abusedis
no answer. AlJ powers may be abused;but are they then to be
abridged by those who are to administer them,or denied to
have any operation?"
The history of the proceedings in the convention would
seem to showwith regard to this clausethat it had no refer-
ence whatever,to the subsequently enumertaed powers. The first
resolution adopted on the subject of the powers of the general
government was,"that the national legislature ought to be em-
powaered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by
the Uonfederationand moreover to legislate in all cases to
which the separate states are incompetent,or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise
of independent legislation." Jour.of Con.pp,68,80,87,135,233.
Later it was amended so as to read: "And,moreover,to legis-
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late in all cases for the general interest of the Union,and
also in those,to which the state are separately incompetent,
or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-rupt-
ed by the exercise of individual legislation." Id. ,p,181,182,
208.
The first draft of the Constitution reported by the
"6oflmittee of Detail" on August 0,1787,read as folows: "The
legislature of the United states shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes,duties,imposts and excises:" there being no
limitation whatever,on the power to levy taxes. Later steps
were taken with a view to providing for the payment of debts
incurred during the Revolutionary War. A committee of eleven
was appointed to consid :r the expediency of the general gov-
ernment assuming the debts incurred by the several states dur-
ing that struggle. The report of this conmnittee was as fol-
lows: "The legislature of the United States shall have power
to fulfill the engagementswhich have been entered into by
Congress,and to discharge,as well the debts of the United
States as the debts incurred by the several states during the
late warfor the conrmon defence and general welfare." After-
wards it was moved to amend the report so as to read as fol-
lows: "The legislature shall fulfill the engagements and dis-
charge the debts of the United States," which passed unamiimous-
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ly after an ineffectual attempt to change the phrase "dis-
charge the debts" to "liquidate the claim." Id.,279,280.
Later the following amendment to the first section of
the seventh article,(to lay and collect taxes etc.,) was mov-
ed and carried: "7he legislature shall fulfill the engagements
and discharge the debts of the United States,and shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties,imposts and excises."
Id.,284. On a subsequent day the following clause was proposed
and agreed to: "All debts contracted,and engagements entered
into y or under the authority of Congress,shall be as valid
against the United States under this Constitutionas under the
Confederation." On the following day the following amendment to
the article,(to lay taxes etc.,) was proposed -nd defeated:
"For the payment of said debtsand for the defraying the expen-
ses,that shall be incurred for the common defence and general
wellfare. " Id. ,291.
So that as yet the power to lay and collect taxes was unlin-
ited. Whatever dissatisfaction there was seems clearly to have
been in allowing Congress to have this power without a check
somewhere. On September 4,another committee reported that the
clause respecting taxation should read as follows: "The legis-
lature shall have power to lay and collect taxes,duties iM-
posts and excises,to pay the debts and provide for
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the common defence and general weifare of the United States."
This is substantially as it now stands in the Constitution.
From this it will be seen that it was never discussec! as an
independent power;nor as a mere prelude to the subsequent pow-
ers. What discussion there was in regard to this clause was
in connection with the power to lay t xes. Whether or not the
taxing power should be unqualified seems clearly to have been
the only question under discussion.
"This clause has no reference whatsoever to the Articles
of Confederation nor indeedto any other clause of the Consti-
tution.It is on its facea distinct,substantiveand independ-
ent power. Who then is at liberty to say that it is to be lim-
ited by the other clausesrather than they to be enlarged by
it; since there is no avvowed connection or reference from the
one to the other? Interpretation woul.d here desert its proper
office,that which requires that every part of the expression
ought,if possible to be alloweCd some meaning and made to con-
spire to some common end." Story on Const. § 917.
It has been further urged in favor of the narrowe& con-
struction that it matters litle whether the clause in question
is to be construed to embody every measure that would be con-
ducive to the general welfare;or every measure only in which
there might be an appcr .Iiation of money,as is contended by
some;the effect would be the same in making useless the subse-
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quently enumeration of powers. For it is said that theice is no
power which may not have some refer'ence to the corrnon defence
and general welfare;nor a power which in its exercise does
not involve an appropriation of money. According to this in-
terpretation it is said we have an unlimited government found-
ed by a particular enumeration of powers.
There is no better refutation than that given by Judge
Story :t § 919, he says: "Stripped of the ingenious textureby
which this argument is disguised,it is neither more or less,
than an attent to obliberate from the Constitution the whole
clause 'to pa, the debts,and provide for the commion defence
an. general welfare of the United States',as entirely sens-
lessor ineqp rjssive of any intention whatsoever* Strike them
out,and the Constitution is exactly what the argument con-
tends for.It is,thereforean argument,that the words ought
not to be in the Constitution because if they are,and have
any meaning,they enlarge it beyond the scope of certain enum-
erated powers and this is both miscievous and dangerous"
To deny effect to any clause in the Constitutibn,if it
is sensible in the language in which it is expressed and in
the place in which it stands would certainly seem to be a most
unjustifiable latitude of imterpretation. If words are insert-
ed we are bound to presume that they have some definite object
14.
and intent; and to reason them out of the Constitution upon ar-
guments ab inconvenienti (which to one mind may appear wholly
unfoundedand to another wholly satisfactory) is to make a new
Constitution not to construe the old one.
Some of our greatest men have advanced the argument which
Judge Story critizes as unsound and in violation of recognized
rules of interpretation. Mr Madisonwho next to Hamiltonper-
haps possessed the greatest knowledge of every phase of our
national government,held these vievws. Thomas Jefferson was
always a$ strong opponent of the liberal construction;though in
carrying on the government he was obliged to relax in practice
what he so ably contended for in theory. Tiedeman on Const.
Law,p ,133.
Alexander Hamiltom believed in a liberal construction
of all the powers granted to the Federal government.ln favor
of this theory as applied to the clause in question he said:
"The terms 'general welfare' we-,e doubtless intended to sig-
nify more than was ex- Iessed or was imparted in those which
followed;otherwisenumereous exigencies incident to the affairs
of a nation would have been left without a provision. The
phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have been used
because it was not fit that the Constitutional authority of
the Union to appropriate its revenue should have been restrict-
ed within narrower limits than the 'general aelf are, ' and
because this necessarily embraced a vast varietj of partic-
ulars,which are susceptible neither of specification nor def-
inition. It is,therefore,of necessity left to the discretion
of the national legislature to pronounce upon the subjects
which concern the general welfare and for which under that
description,an appropriatioi uf money is Ipequisite and proper'
One Hamilton's Works (1810,p,2 3 0).
This is the interpretation given by one ofif not the
greatest,of those great men who founded our goverrnat. Hamil-
ton's Writings seemin the estimation of the greatest writers
in America,Great Britain and France,to place him in the
first rank of master minds. It has been said that they exhibit
an extent and precision of information,a profundity of re-
search and an accuracy of understanding,which would have done
honor to the most illustrious statesmen of ancient or modern
times. From his large experience as one of the framers of the
Constitution;his numereous writings and deep study of every
phase of our governmient;certainly his vievas on this subject
are entitled to much weight. And whether his vievis are in ac-
cord with the true meaning intended to be conveyed or not,
they are in harmony with the practice of the government for
the past one hundred years. Appropriation have never been
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limited by Congress to cases fully within the specific powers
enunerated in the ConstitutTon,whether looked upon in their
broad or narrow sense. Money has been raised in an especial
manner to aid internal improvements of all kinds,in our roads,
for the purpose of navigation and other objects of national
character and importance. (Pres. Munroe's Message of Tay 4,
1822) In 1794,Congress raised money to aid the St.Domingo ref-
ugees.(Act of Feb.12,1794,ch.2.) Again in 1812,money was rais-
ed to aid the inhabitants of Venezuela who had suffered from
an earth quake. (Act of May 8,1812,ch.79.) It would indeed be
difficult to justify such legislation under any of the powers
delegated to the general government. Another illustration of
a domestic naturewhich is identical with the sugar bounty
clause,is the bounty given in the cod fisheries in 1702. (Act
of Feb.16,1792,ch.6.) The annual appropriation acts speak very
strong language on this point. Every president of the United
Stateswith the single exception of Madison,seems to have act-
ed upon this doctrine. Mr Jefferson certainly gave it a par-
tial sanction in signing the bill for the Cumberland road.
(Act of March 29,1806,ch.19.) President jackson followed with
manifest reluctancebut allowed that it was firmly established
by the practice of the governmEnt. (See veto of Maysville Road
BillMay 27, 1830.)
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It is safe to say then,that so far as a course of legis-
lative enactments can settle anything,the power of Congress to
provide for the general ,welfare of the nation,by means which
are plainly adapted to that end,and not prohibited,may be con-
sidered as well established. In other words though r-uch dis-
cussion,has been indulged and no judicial tribunal ha3 ever
been callec! upon to squarely place a construction upon the
"general vwelfare"clause,yet the people of this country have
solved the question in conformity with the broader construc-
t ion.
But even if it were truethat the framers of the Constit-.
tion believed that they had provided for all the exigencies
that would have to do with the general welfare of the people;
and that the subsequently enumerated powers included all that
the general welfare clause meant at that stage of the world,
there could be no great objection to giving to that clause the
new shade of meaning which the terms general welfare may
have to day. It is generally conceded by all that the people
of the United States have nothing to regret,as yet because of
the concessions of power made by the states from time to time
to the Federal government. The newly added strength has in
each instance worked admirably. More and more as time goes on,
our people regard the close of our late war as marking the
completion of our national government. The fears and jealous-
18.
ies of the tyrnany of governmentsentertained so largely by
our forefathers,are no longer a part of the anxieties of the
people. These misgivings were honestly entertained, being
born out of their political experience with Colonial govern-
ors,and the cruel treatment received at the hands of a tyrran-
ical government three thousand miles away. It was natural
that they should look upon any form of government as they did.
But time and experience have proven that agovernment wholly
dependent upon the people for their existence;a government
over which the people have absolute control;in short,a govern-
ment which,Pn our caseare the people themselveswill never
attempt much tyranny; for to do that,would be to oppress them-
selveswhich is unatural for man to do.
Indeedso well pleased have the people been with the
workings of the national government that there is going up a
cry to da that its jurisdiction should be extended. Many
think that every interest in which the public can be concern-
ed ought to be managed by the general government. Railroads,
telegraphs,express companies and similar corporations should,
it is arguedbe owned and controlled by the general govern-
ment;by this they would be made to serve the pablic better at
much less expense. Another equally earnest school urges the
nationalization of land as the panacea of all human ills;vrhile
19.
While a third thinks that the government should be the common
parent of us all,taking every interest whatever under its con-
trol, This is the condition of things that confronts us to
day. Whether we are passing from better to worse or vice versa,
does not enter into the question under consideration. These
facts exist,and show beyond all question that the terms "gen-
eral wel.iare of the United States" as accepted to day,haA a
widely different meaning from that of one hundred years ago,
The progress we have made for the past century has not only
added new meanings to old words,but conditions and relations
have arisen in the commercial,and politico- economic world
that could not have been forseen by our ancestors.
Would it be in accordance with recognized rules of in-
terpretation to give these new shades of meaning to the writ-
ten words in the constitution when it was plain that the fram-
ers of that document could never have had them in mind? It
will not be denied that a true interpretation of the 11-w will
disclose the real intention of the law giver;but in countries
in which popular governments are established the real law giv-
er is not the men who years ago made the law;it is the living
power which is the people in possession of political power.
The correct interpreter of the law need not trouble himself
so much with the intention of the framers of the Constitution
20.
as with the modifications of the written word. This rule is
recognized by eminent authority. Dr Lieber recognizes this
factor when in distinguishing between the interpretation and
the construction of a constitutioal provisionhe says: "That a
constitutional sentence then, must be interpreted if we are
desirous to ascertain what precise meaning the framers of the
constitution attached to it;and construedif we are desirous
of knowing how they would have understood it,respecting new
relations which they could not have known at the time and
which nevertheless,fall decidely within the province of this
provision." (Hermeneutics p,168.)
Chief Justice Marshall may be said to have sanctioned
the same rule in the celebrated Dartmouth College Case. He
said: "That a case may come within the operation of a constitu
tional provision,even though the framers of the constitution
did not anticipate it,providing there is nothing in the writ-
ten word to indicate that they would have excluded it,if it
had been anticipated."
The conclusion is obivious then,that the "general wel
fare" phrase has a meaning per se. It has it :first,from a
fair and natural construction as the clause stands; second, it
has been established by the practice of our government for the
past century,though frequently disputed on the floors of Con-
21.
gress by the party out of power. And a contemporaneous exposi-
tion of the constitution practiced and acqutsced under for
such a length of time,fixes the constitution and the courts
refuse to shake or control it. (Swaurt v.Laird 1 Cranch 299;
Martins v.llunter's Lessee 1 Wheaton,304;Cohen v.Com.of Va.6
Wheaton 204;Prig v.Com.Pa.16 Peters,569;olcott v.Supervisors,
10 Wall.pp,690-91.)
Third,if the "general welfare" clause had no wider mean-
ing thdn what is included in the subsequent powers at the
time our government was founded, it has come to include more
and the new meaning may be read into it.
If this does not establish conclusively,it is certainly
sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether Congress is vested
with a greater power than that given by the sixteen subsequent
enumerations following the general clause. The benefit of
that doubt must be given to the legislature;as it is never to
be presumed that they overstep/ed their authority. Judge Cool-
ey says: "A doubt of the constitutional validity of a statute
is never sufficient to warrant its being set aside."
'-°
The extent to which the courts may go in declaring an act of
the legislature void 7ill ne-:t be considered. There has boeen
much difference of opinion as to how far the courts should go;
there are some dicta in the various cases that wouldi indicate
that the courts are not generally agreed upon this point. But
there are some well settled rules recognized oy all our courts
in passing upon the validity of an legislative enactment.
Amon - these is that the national legislature is as omnip-
otent as the English Parliament,over subjects committed to
its care;and while it confines itself within the scope of its
power,none of its acts can be questioned on constitutional
grounds. It is only .hen Congress legislates upon subjects
not within the sphere of its authority;or uses means to af-
fect an end,when such means are prohibited,that an act may be
declared unconstitutional by the courts. The mere fact that
a legislative act is unjust or oppressive;that it violates
rights and privileges of the citizen,is not sufficient to au-
thorize a court to declare it voidunless it can be shown
that such injustice is prohibitedor such rights and privil-
eges guarranteed by the constitution. Judge Cooley says: "The
judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it
23.
conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of op-
inions upon points of rightreason,and expediency with tho
law makin rower. The question of the validity of a statute
must always be one of legislative competency to enact it;not
one of policy,propriety or strict justice."
Chief Justice MJarshall says: ULet the ena be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution,and all means
\vich are appropriate,vrhich are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited,but consist with the letter and the
spirit of the constitution,are constitutional."
No rule of law is better settled than that laid down
above by Marshall and Cooley. And it is settled wisely;for if
the courts were at liberty to determine the validity of legis-
lative acts on grounds of natural justice,legislation could
not be carried on without their assent.
A rule equally as well settled,and about which the-e
can be no question,is that Conrress can laY and collect taxes
for no other than a public purpose. Taxation is a mode of
raising revenue;revenue cannot be raisea for a private pur-
pose. When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected
with the public interests or welfare,it ceases to be taxation
and becomes plunder.
iBut it must be remembered that what is for the pLablic
24.
good,and whit a 1e public purposesare qu,.1stions which the lef-
islature must decide upon its own judgment,and in respect to
which it is invested with large discretion which cannot be
controlled b: the courts,except,perhaps :,here its action is
clearly evasive,and whee under pretense of lawful authority,
it has presumed to exercise one that is unlawrul." (Cooley's
Const.Lim.p ,157).
Where the power that is exercised is legislative in its
character,the courts can enforce only those limitation which
the constitution imposes;not those implied restrictions which
resting in theory only,the people have been sAtisfied to leave
to the judgment,patriotism,and sense of justice of their rep-
resentatives. Where however,a tax is clearly laid for a pri-
vate purpose; and this can be seen at first blush;the public
interests being in no way affected by it; such a tax is accord-
ing to the weighIt of authority void,and it within the power
of the courts to so declare it.
To accurately define what constitutes a public purpose
as distinguished from a private wouild be a difficult task.
There is but one standard by which it can be decided which is
the popular will. What wo-Uid be beneficial to the public and
clearly for the general good in one instance,might not in
another. An interest that would be consiaered strictly pri-
25.
vate in one age might be looked upon as one in which the pub-
lic was interested by a later generation. If a majority of the
people of the United States should become believers of the
Bellamy doctrine,then virtually all interests whatsoever
wiould be public. At one time it was thought by nearly all peo-
plejto be for the general welfare of governments to have an
established religion;or one to which the state gave assist-
ance. This is so in many countries at the present time.
But the American people have decided that it is for the
general good of the nation to neither hamper or aid any par-
ticular creed. The wisdom of this policy has been clearly
proven;and the indications are that at no far distant day all
peoples will adopt the same view. It may be asked what does
this prove? It proves that such questions must be decided by
the people and by no other power. This being so,if a majority
of the American people decide that developing the United
States into a sugar producing nation would promote the gener-
al welfare of the people,I know of no power that can restrict
a legislative enactment looking to such an endupon the ground
that it was a mistaken policy. All the court could say in
such a case would be, that the legislature,had passed an act
whichin the opinion of the judges was contrary to abstract
principles of right.
"Independently of express constitutional restrictions,
'IJo
it (legislature) can make appropriations of money whenever th2
rublic may require,or will be promoted oy itan it is the
judge of what is for the public good. "(Judge Denio 3 Kernanp,
145)
"The doctrine that there exists in the judiciary some
vagueloose and undefined power to annul a lawbecause in its
judgment it is contrary to nature,equity and justice,is in
conflict with the first principles of government,and can never
I think be maintained," (Judge Sheldon Id.,p,428).
Some other ground wiotud have to be shown to justify a
court in declaring it void. If paying bounties to sugar pro-
ducers works an injustice,and such injustice is prohibited,
it would be sufficient. If it violates some right,and such
right is guarranteedthe same would be true.
The only grounds upon which either of these objections
could be raised,is that the act contemplates using revenues
for a private purpose. This point was raised in Congress by
the opposition. It was argued that in lending government aid
to sugar producers,the whole people were being taxed to build
up a private industry.
A hypothetical case involving the validity of this
clause alone,vzas recently argued before the Moot Court of the
Cornell University School of Law. It was aeclared void on
this ground by the supreme court and on appeal the decision
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was affirmed by the upper court. Chief Justice Hutchinsin a
very able orinion,after giving much study of what constitutes
a public as distinguished from a private interest,held that
the clause could not stand as it taxed the people for a purely
private purpose. He staid: "A public purpose,as I understand
the term,is a purpose that has in view the general public. An
act is for the public benefit when its immediate object is
the good of the people or members of the body politic. If it
is primarily for the advantage of a private enterprise and
only indirectly beneficial to the publicit cannot in reason
or in law be classed as legislation for the public good.......
...... It is apparent,I think,that the direct purpose of this
law is private in its character. "
Looking at the immediate effect of the act,which is to
pay to private individuals money taken from the hational
treasury;and making that the test of its public or private
characterthe conclusion reached by the court is both reas na-
ble and sound. But it is by no means well settled that such
is the true test by which to be guided in such a case. It is
laid down in numerous cases that it is the ultimate end or
object of appropriations that must be looked to in deciding
the character of the use for which the money is expended.
Chief Justice Dickinson in 19 Wis. 689,says: "It is not
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the individual payment that tests the public character of the
appropriation. Inividuals are always the recipients of pub-
lic funds. We find it paid by viay of bounty for the scalps of
panthers,wolves,foxes,crows,blackbirds,to the poor,to the
education of the young,as rewards for the apprehension of
horse thieves~colleges,agricultural societies,and to other
useful objects."
One of the ablest judges that ever adorned the supreme
bench of Pennsylvania said: "It is enough that we can see
any possible public interest in the act,or public benefit to
be derived from it. All beyond that is a question of exped-
iency for the legislature,not of law,much less of constitu-
tional law to be determined by the courts." ( 21 Pa.St.147).
Tumerous other cases of high atLthority might be cited to
the same effect if space would permit. Enough has been quoted
differ
howeverto show that the court sAupon what is the proper test
in passing on this question. !]or is it surprisingsas it in-
volves a question of policy;and judges being faliable,are as
liable to err in their judgment upon sich matters as the
legislators.
The arguments for and against the expediency of this
I egislationforms no part of the subject of this paper. It is
sufficient to say that they existas was abundantly shown in
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the debates on the bill in Congress. Upon the subject party
lines were sharply drawn. If an injustice has been perpetrated
upon the people by the passage of this actit can be effect-
ively remedied by the people as by a judicial decision. There
is much unjust legislation for which the only remedy is the
chastisement at the polls of our repi-esentatives,who have
betrayed the trust imposed in them.
That able and learned jurist,Judge Dillon,has said:
"Justice has her imperial seat in the bossom of every man-and
there,and not on specific constitutional provisions,must re-
lief be had in many cases of indenfensible legislation-the
remedy being,to secure a repeal of the law and not its judic-
ial annulment. "
It is further more true that those who are entrusted
with making our laws have a greater dread of being "scourged
into retirement by their indignant masters" than of a me-e
judicial decision or decree. The highest ambition of our pub-
lic men is to please the people;not to offend them by propos-
ing measures with which they have no sympathy. A thorough ex-
amination of the "popular pulse" generally precedes every s
step taken by our legislators both state and national. The
people are not only the source of all power;but are fast be-
coming the source from which our public men draw their con-
victions on the questions of the day.
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The validity of giving government aid for the purpose
of developing the United States into a sugar growing country,
is soon to be pa.3sed upon,it is said,by the highest judicial
tribunal in the land. The decision will be waited with much
interest,owing to the extensive discussion that has taken
place both in Congress and by the press of the countryv 4i "
As to whether Congress has power to pass laws looking
to the general welfare of the country,under subdivision one
of section eightthere can be no doubt. It is also well set-
tled,that the people through their representatives in Con-
gress are the judges of what is for the public good and what
is not.
It would appear,according to one standard of deciding
what is a public and what a private interest that the means
adopted in this instance are illegal;by another standard it is
safe to say that they are not. The result is that a doubt id
raised so long as there is no recognized standard by which it
can be tested. The act,as has been shown before, is entitled
to the benefit of the doubt. This being so, the validity of the
sugar bounty clause of the M!cKinley Tariff is established.

